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NOTE OF TRANSMITTAL
This report is prepared for the Office of
Applications, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
under Statement of work on Contract NASW-2558 which represents
an evaluation of the improvement in worldwide wheat crop
information promised by a LANDSAT-type Earth Resources Survey
(ERS) System.
The results reported herein are based on the best
public data available on world wheat crop information. The
economic approach used for this study represents significant
innovations in the valuation of improved information on
agricultural crops. In addition to this report, a separate
volume providing a more detailed account of this study is
transmitted, wherein methodological and mathematical modeling
issues are discussed. To our knowledge, this is the first em-
pirical assessment of the economic value of a LANDSAT system
in providing information on the worldwide wheat crop.
Other than the study director, the principal
participants in this study effort were Francis Sand, Andrew
Seidel, Dennis Warner, Neil Sheflin, Ran 3hattacharyya and
John Andrews, each of whom made important contributions to this
study.
Dr. Klaus P. Heiss
Study Director
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ABSTRACT
The Earth Resources Survey (ERS) and the LANDSAT
Program of NASA in particular, face some important decisions
over the next 12 to 18 months that will affect the future of
remote sensing by satellite in civilian applications for
decades to come. To provide an economic basis for the dis-
cussion of these issues, ECON, Inc. completed an overview
evaluation of a LANDSAT-type Earth Resources Survey system
in 1974*. Potentially large benefits to be obtained in agri-
culture from a continuity of LANDSAT data services when
applied to the United States were identified and measured.
This report is an extension in breadth and depth of
these ECON agricultural case study efforts. The value of
worldwide information improvements on wheat crops, promised by
LANDSAT, is measured in the context of world wheat markets.
These benefits are based on current LANDSAT technical goals
and assume that information is made available to all -- United
States and other countries -- at the same time.
The benefits to the United States of such public
LANDSAT information on wheat crops are, on the average, 174
million dollars a year. About 287 million dollars accrue
*ECON, Inc., The Economic Value of Remote Sensing of Earth
Resources from Space: An ERTS Overview and the Value of
Continuity of Service, 10 Volumes, Princeton, New Jersey,
December 1974.
iii
it
directly to United States consumers in the form of lower
6
average wheat prices; $ 280 million are production efficiency
gains in providing for domestic and foreign demand. These
benefits are those of a LANDSAT system with possibly as many
I
as three operating spacecraft. The benefits from improved
wheat crop information compare favorably with the annual
system's cost of about $62 million.
to
A detailed empirical sample demonstration of the
effect of improved information is given; the history of wheat
commodity prices for 1971-72 is reconstructed and the price,
M
changes from improved vs. historical information are compared.
These results reaffirm the conclusions reached by
ECON in its December, 1974 report in the most important area:
LANDSAT promises substantial benefits from improved information
in agriculture if present technical goals and expectations are
met. The improved crop forecasting from a LANDSAT system as-
sumed in this study are: wheat crop estimates of 90 percent
accuracy for each major wheat producing region, at a 90 percent
confidence level through the wheat harvest period. This trans-
lates rough3.^- into a 1.R percent error in December wheat crop
production estimates for the United States and 5.0 percent for
zhe rest of the world.
The technical performance and capabilities of a
LANDSAT system are stiles being developed by NASA; our estimate
iv
on technical capabilities of a LANDSAT system are based on a
considered interpretation and extension of LANDSAT investiga-
tions to date, and were given to us by NASA.
In conclusion, accurate, objective worldwide wheat
crop information using space systems may have a very stabil-
izing influence on world commodity markets, in part making
possible the establishment of long-term, stable trade rela-
tionships.
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1. OVERVIEW
"We live only by knowing something about the
future; while the problems of life, or of con-
duct at least, arise from the fact that we
know so little."*
1.1	 Introduction
This study is an attempt to measure the economic
value of the improvements in worldwide wheat crop information,
promised by the use of remote sensing earth resource
satellites. Because the costs of such an information-gather-
ing system are being borne by the United States, it is appro-
priate that the benefits be estimated with specific reference
to the United States. However, the interdependence of region-
al economics makes it imperative that the benefits !rom this
improved information also be estimated for the rest of the
world. In particular, the study tries to answer the
following questions:
(1) Can a LANDSAT-type system of gathering crop
information, worldwide, improve the existing crop information?
(2) Will the United States gain or lose by publish-
ing such information?
1
Knight, F. H., Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, Harper and Row
Publishers, Inc., New York, New York 1965.
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(3) What segments of the United States economy
will gain or lose from this information?
(4) Will the Rest of the World gain or lose from
improved crop information?
The first issue of course is a technical one in
part and not really in the domain of this study. We assume
here that the technical goals of LANDSAT are achievable.
Moreover, we assume that the crop information generated by
LANDSAT will be made available simultaneously and on an
equitable basis to all countries. However, we will proceed
to state carefully the existing accuracy of crop information
of all major regions and the assumed improvements that a
LANDSAT system promises to bring. It is understood that any
such significant improvement is a long-term goal to be
achieved over many years, say by 1985.
Concerning the second, third and fourth questions,
this study presents several significant achievements in the
analysis of benefits from improved information. Considerable
theoretic interest in the economics of information has
blossomed in the 1960s and early 1970s; yet astonishingly
few, if any, attempts of measuring the value of information
and uncertainty in markets have been made. In this sense
this study is exploring new territory. It is for this
reason that we set out -- rather pedantically and at length --
to state our approach and its implementation.
1-Z
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In addition to our assumption that all LANDSAT
information will be made available to all countries simul-
taneously, there are two other assumptions pervading this
analysis. First, the world marketplace will use LANDSAT
information when and if that information is more accurate
than the information from currently available alternative
sources. Second, that world trade will be rational.
Although the LANDSAT system has the potential to
monitor many crops worldwide, this study focuses on one of
the most important -- wheat. To be sure, the greater the
crop coverage, the larger the benefits from i 1% . _ oved crop
information. Nevertheless, wheat is 6, major	 rld crop
and likely to -:count for s large share of the benefits from
LANDSAT.
Before turning to detailed descriptions of the
i	 satellite system, its potential importance and the scope
and focus of this study, it is important to point out that
there are two principal reasons why the benefits to the
United States estimated in this study are likely to be on the
low side. First, not all countries have historically
followed our assumption of simultaneous distribution of crop
information to all on an equitable basis. The United States
is indisputably the world's leader in the collection and
publication of agricultural crop production statistics. In
contrast, a few countries knowingly distort or hide their
1-3
Icrop successes or failures. Insofar as the LANDSAT system
1
would apply to all countries, added benefits can be expected
from improved crap information to Free World commodity
markets beyond *_hose reported here. Secondly, in the United
1
States, as elsewhere, strong agricultural price " stabilization"
policies have been pursued in the past -- sometimes with
success. Thus, the price fluctuations observed in the free
market reflect only part of the existing true uncertainty in
crop information and only this part is measured in this
study.
1.2	 Information and the World Food Situation
The importance of this effort is underscored by the
I
	
	 increasingly difficult world food situation of the next
decades and the role improved information will play therein.
In 1963, the FAO Third World Food Survey estimated
i
that 300 to 500 million people were underfed each year from
1957 to 1959 and that 60 percent of the population in underde-
veloped ^-.as lived on diets that were nutritionally inadequate
18l. The proposed solution to the problem then was to increase
world food S upplies by 75 percent by the year 2000. In *.h.-
ensuing decade, scientists have brought the "green revolution"
to the world. Harvest yields can be two or three times greater
than those achieved in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Yet.
eleven years after the FAO Third World Food Survey, it was
r
reported at the World Food Conference in Rome that over a
1 -a
i
i
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billion people now are underfed each year and that millions
of people were likely to starve in the next two years [8).
As in 1953, the principal solution in this Malthusian night-
mare was to increase aggregate food supply.
To a large extent, however, the extent of aggre-
gate world food production is not the problem. The protein
content of aggregate world food supply theoretically is more
than adequate according to safe levels of protein intake re-
commended by food nutritionists [2,34). In fact, the lack of
available food supply may be more apparent than real.
According to Parpia [71, "The per capita availability of food
grains is about two and one half times the requi.-_went. if
protein (all sources) is taken as the main qualitative measure
and its daily requirement at 70 grams per capita, the total
availability is also more than twice the requirement."
These considerations lend weight to the importance
the distribution problem has received at the 1974 world Food
Conference [8, 91. Although only one of many recommendations
of that conference, we believe this aspect of the world food
crisis to be as important as the physical production of
crops: distribution of supplies from surplus regions to
deficit regions, from times of abundance to times of scarcity,
within nations and between nations. This proposition,
of course, does not imply that greatly increased world food
supplies would not alleviate the current "food shortage."
0
I
t
Rather, it recognizes that more efficient distribution of
existing supplies promises substantial direct and indirect
benefits to the world where continued starvation of a large
part of its people is still the rule. And developed countries,
including the United States, are no exception. The organiza-
tions and structure of responsibilities resulting from the 1974
conference are shown in Figure 1.1.
There are, of course, many theories to improve
world food distribution, some naive, others shortsighted and
a few worth serious consideration. One of the more exciting
possibilities on the technological horizon is the improvement
of worldwide crop measurements.
Most people, even professional economists
responsible for decisions in the agriculture field, may have
the mistaken impression that crop production statistics,
worldwide, region by region, are well known quantities with
little further opportunity to improve such statistics and
estimates. If only it were so. In fact, quite little is
known in world markets of crop production on a regional basis.
The country with the largest food grain production by far,
the Soviot Union, does not know its own harvest, as shown by
its own statistics, to within better than + 30 percent (even
well within the harvest season). Some other countries do no
better. This shortcoming sometimes leads to numerou- locally
isolated agriculture markets even within one country -- and
1-6
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relatively large price differences between these decentralized,
nonconnected regions. while there are many other economic
constraints that impose such differences in food available
for consumption -- when it is needed and where it is needed --
with ensuing differences in food prices, one major contributing
factor is simply the lack of accurate, timely, complete infor-
I	 mation.
1.3	 World Crop Information and the Promise of LANDSAT
The potential value of improving information rests
on two results in economic general equilibrium analysis.
First, the allocation of resources to satisfy needs (market
efficiency) improves with better public information.* Second,
all parties engaged in rational, free trade stand to gain from
such trade. These general statements suggest -- a priori --
that an improved, public, worldwide crop monitoring system'
1
may benefit at least some countries without hurting any others.
While exceptions to these two general rules can
be found or constructed -- with considerable ingenuity -- those
exceptions rest, nevertheless, rather on ingenuity than fact
as long as the information improvement is on matters concerning
each person more or less equally, such as is the case in a well
organized futures and spot market.
*
Public information herein means information made available in
readily accessible and understandable form to everybody at the
same time, at little or no direct cost.
1-8
6There are four attributes to each commodity transac-
9
	
	 tion and its price: quantity, quality, time and place. No
commodity price makes sense without stating -- explicitly or
implicitly -- each of these four attributes. Yet in the
discussion of world food problems, attention focuses too
readily on but one of those attributes: quantity. Remote
sensing systems can improve information -- and hence lead
to benefits -- in all four areas: how large are crops in
fact, when can they be expected, where are they located and,
possibly at some future time, what is the quality of the crops?
0	
As information is improved on any one of these attributes --
or a combination of them -- price differences now observed
over time and across different areas (countries, regions)
will be narrowed through the workings of the commodity
market. This market is most precisely developed in food
commodities, spot and futures, and hence it lends itself to
an empirical investigation and measurement of the value of
information improvements through changes in expected price
patterns.
How little is known about future supplies of commodi-
ties today is best reflected by the violent movement of wheat
prices over the past several years. Movements in the price
per bushel from $2 to $6, to $4, to $6, to $3 all within a
few dozen months (as shown in Figure 1.2), are but one very
direct expression of this uncertainty and lack of information.
Dollars
per Lushel
8.50
5.50
5.00
4.50
4.00
3.50
3.00
2. 50
2.00
1.50
1.00
.50
1972 1973	 1974	 1975
Figure 1.2 Wheat Price Movement, 1972-1975
_I
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To date, worldwide crop measurements are heavy
with errors and they are late, if available to all. Improved
accuracy and timeliness of worldwide crop measurements may, on
the average, improve the ability of famine-prone areas to
prepare for harvest shortfalls months in advance of their
current capabilities and eliminate, or at least reduce the
suffering that otherwise would have occurred. Similarly,
improved worldwide crop monitoring would give all trading
partners a clearer picture of the market and reduce the
frequency and amount of waste owing to inaccurate information
among the market participants. Short of involving the specter
of starvation, improved crop information may lead to a closer
worldwide agreement of spot prices where any difference in
spot prices between regions may be interpreted as an economic
measure of existing inefficiencies in distribution of crops
and relative scarcities.
To appreciate the potential for such a worldwide
system, consider the 1974 world food situation as of July 1,
1974 -- a more or less recurring situation in recent years.
At that time, the expected world food grain crop was 710
million metric tons, assuming that all the harvests came in
without a serious shortfall. However, there was considerable
uncertainty surrounding the 1974 harvest at that date. Over
100 million metric tons were in jeopardy and most of it could
I
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not be monitored regularly, if at all. The major areas of
uncertainty were North America between 112 6W to 95°W and
45 0W to 55°N; U.S.S.R. between 65 0 E to 90 0 E and 45 0 N to
57°N; China between 110 6 E to 125°E and 40°N to 52 0 N; and India,
where the timing of the monsoon and its location posed a
serious threat. Improved knowledge of the world grain crops
at that time could have led to improved distribution of
existing and expected supplies in several ways.
	 -
Among the measures proposed to .deal with such un-
certainties is the creation of a world food fund (then proposed
at 10 million metric tons), and the use of futures contracts
to hedge against a large shortfall. But that food fund --
however large -- has to come from somewhere too! The informa-
tion necessary to coordinate the acquisition and distribution
of world food funds is lacking too. One result of this im-
perfect state of knowledge is a wild fluctuation in wheat
prices.
In Figure 1.3 the major wheat growing areas of the
world are shown. The areas shown in Figure 1.3 are very
large and extensive. Foremost among them are the Soviet
Union, the United States, China, Canada, Australia, India and
Argentina. Two of these regions are in the Southern Hemis-
phere: their production cycle is "out-of-phase" with that
of the Northern Hemisphere. Thus, worldwide wheat har-
vesting occurs in several seasons. Moreover, there are
1-12
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important time differences even within the Northern Hemi-
sphere in the agricultural crop calendars for wheat (plowing,
sowing, growth and harvesting) depending on the region and
the type of wheat (e.g., winter wheat, spring wheat). In
Table 1.1 these times are shown by major region and by month
for 1974. Thus, world wheat production is a continuous, dyna-
mic process, ideally requiring a measurement system able to
deal with continuous, large-scale, worldwide changes. To
measure these areas, worldwide, with sufficient accuracy and
in a timely fashion is a very "natural" application of space
systems.
The promise, therefore, is to increase worldwide crop
monitoring capabilities by a sizeable factor. At this time,
NASA is experimenting with earth resource satellite systems
(LANDSAT) that may be able to provide monthly monitoring of
worldwide crop production with accuracies well beyond those
of the information sources available today.
Based on Morain's [6I winter wheat experiment for
NASA and other principal investigator results to date, a
reasonable LANDSAT goal is a total year-end estimation error
of 1-2 percent for the United States and 5 percent for other
world regions. This level of accuracy represents an improve-
ment over current USDA capabilities. The worldwide accuracy
improvements promised by LANDSAT are substantial.
1-14
1
7ro
El
7
O
n x
oc
9
9
0
0
I a
0 c
00
0% x
x
0	 qr N N p"
0 114
a c
a. z
z	 ea
CN
71
P. Ic
-C Ic C 2
z 4 a x
U m
0
1-15
1'
,{ ,	 ,	 ,	 _ {	 ! i	 l	 !	 { {
The ultimate question of course is how much is
this accuracy improvement worth.
1.4	 Information, Prices and Benefits
Information on agricultural crops as used in this
study is simply defined as statements (estimates) of the
quantity (to be) harvested, in each time period, by region.
Each of these statements has a date and error associated with
it. If such statements have been made over a long time, and
consistently on the same region, it is possible to measure
the accuracy ("goodness") of that information in terms of an
error distribution that shows how close these statements come
to the true crop, and whether the expected value from all
these statements actually is the true crop quantity.
Improved information may be viewed as crop estimates
(at the same time) that show less widely dispersed errors
1	 about the "true" value. This is illustrated in the upper
part of Figure 1.4. Also shown in Figure 1.4 is the observa-
tion that estimates with the same error distribution, but one
0	 or two months earlier, may also be of value, since the
error distribution within this period will be substantially
reduced. Indeed, under certain conditions, "earlier" and
1	 "more accurate" crop estimates are equivalent statements.
The measurement of the value of improved information
somehow has to quantify in dollars and cents the effect of
1	 this reduction in dispersion of crop estimate errors.
1-16
Probability	 LANDSAT
LANDSAT Promises
Greater Certainty
of Observing
the True Value
Today
Crop Size
Estimate
Error Variation At A Point in Time
Error
Error Variation Over Time
LANDSAT Promises
Equal Accuracy At
An Earlier Time
Months to Harvest
of After Harvest
f
Figure 1.1 Types of Potential LANDSAT "Improvements"
In Crop Production Information
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VThe value of improved information -- the subject
of this study -- is a timely and difficult topic. While
economic theory and practice have successfully dealt with topics
such as the value of apples and oranges, (i.e., physical com-
modities) information, and the value of information, have not
been treated so successfully in the economic literature.
The basic difficulty of coming to grips with the
value of information can be reduced to two basic reasons.
(1) The cost of gathering information has sometimes
little, if anything, to do with the value of the information
thus gathered. A few telephone calls -- e.g., those of
"John Smith" of Russian Wheat Deal fame in 1972 -- can mean
many millions of dollars in gains. 0, _he other hand, lengthy
and greatly expensive efforts at the systematic gathering of
information sometimes -- or often -- lead to few if any
tangible results. (Foremost among the latter enterprises one
1
may well classify the "China watchers" of the 1960s.) Yet,
in a very loose some, even here one may say that in the
long run the expected value of information generally ought to
offset the very immediate, and more certain, costs.
(2) Information, once obtained, is difficult to
"market," that is to restrict the beneficiaries of information
to that select group that paid for the information and thus
generate enough revenues to cover the cost of gathering the
information. It is difficult to keep information "secret,"
1-19
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i.e., to exclude nonpayers from its benefits. Nor is it
clear that such secrecy is in the national economic interest.
(Quite the contrary is true for crop information, as we will
see!) The reason for this latter state of affairs is the
low cost of reproducing ( distributing) information once it is
obtained. Today's technology is particularly apt to bring
this about.
Given the low cost of information distribution vs.
the often very large cost of gathering the desired information,
the market and the economists are faced with a dilemma:
(1) The low incremental cost of distributing information does
not allow the private enterpreneur to recover this investment
for gathering the information; e.g., in the case of crop esti-
mates using a LANDSAT system, the annual systems cost may be
anywhere from $20 to $60 million a year, while the reproduction
of those estimates may cost 5C to 100 a copy. (2) On the
other hand, economics of efficiency -- and the public good --
clearly indicate that the information should be distributed
at its marginal (incremental) cost to c::rive the largest
benefits to ,ociety.
While patent law, copyright,, etc., try to deal at
least in part with this diler.ma , it nevertheless is all too
easy to destroy such legal paramonopolies when the value of
in^_,rmation greatly exceeds its cost of reproduction and,
furthermore, when the public good thereby is increased.
1-19
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Given these observations on the value of information
and the market, the difficulty faced by economists in dealing
with information -- and the measurement of its value -- is
understandable. The task is furthermore confounded when the
requirement is imposed that the information be made public
to all; i.e., not limited even to the United States.
The complexity of the task is reflected in the
intuitive question: "How can there be value to information
if everybody knows about it?" Although the answer is far
more difficult to state than the question, one of the appeal-
ing insights of this study is that when information is not
published it will have no value to the nation -- or very limited
value at best. Some insight into the latter statement can
be obtained from the recent past.
In the past several years prices for wheat have
fluctuated by unusually large amounts. This in part is a
reflection of the increasingly tight world food situation and
a very incomplete state of knowledge of what the world food
supply actually is (demand for food being rather continuous
and predictable). What influence -- in principle -- improved
information could have had on recent wheat prices is shown in
Figure 1.5. Herein we reproduce the wheat history of 1972,
the year of the "great" Russian wheat Deal. If through
some mechanism, e.g., LANDSAT, one had known in May what
everybody knew by September, namely the dismal situation of
1-20
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Ithe Russian grain crop that year, then two price effects
would have set in: (1) prices in May, June and July would
have risen above the historical prices, and (2) prices in
August, September, November, etc., would have risen less than
the historical prices. That is to say, improved public infor-
mation would have led to price smoothing effects over time.
The full economic impacts of such a change in wheat prices
would have been considerable: exports in the early and later
months would have been different in quantities and prices
transacted, inventory decisions (on the farms and off the farms)
would have changed, and so would industrial and feed use of
wheat. With regard to international trade, it is likely that
at a higher world market price, the Soviet Union would have
bought less wheat thus diminishing the full price impact on
United States households.
All these myriads of decisions would have been
made automatically by the market once improved accurate
information entered it in May: there is no economic need
to distribute crop information to "final users" once it has
been made public -- an often misleading concern in technical
investigations on the uses of LANDSAT information -- since
commodity markets exist that transmit this information
through changed prices.
To state and measure the value of such public
information, this study proceeds in two steps:
1-22
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Step 1: Improved public information on agricultural
crops will have -- measurable -- price effects.
Step 2: The measured price effects from improved
information lead to measurable benefits to society.
This second step one could accept at face value --
based on the history of economic thought -- but for two
reasons. First, one needs to balance the cost of improving
information with the benefits derived from this information.
Secondly, the erroneous belief is still widespread -- and
sometimes put in writing -- that improved information, world-
wide, is harmful to the United States. This would be quite a
startling discovery, going not only against hundreds of years
of economic thought and doctrine on the workings of free mar-
kets but, beyond that, it contradicts the history of 1972
which still should be fresh in our memory.
This question often has been reversed: if the
United States were to gain from LANDSAT information, does that
imply that other regions and countries will be harmed therebv?
The answer, of course, is no! On the contrary, the gains of
other countries may be larger -- in proportion -- than those
of the United States. Most economic transactions and events
.=	 are of this type, foremost in international trade, but also,
of course, as regards improved public information.
II
i-.	 i
1.5
	
Scope and Methodology
The overall approach -- or logic -- of this study
is depicted in Figure 1.6. First, the accuracy profile of
crop information is measured for different length projections.
This information then is traced through the market where it
helps determine today's prices.
	 These prices of course are
determined jointly with flows of quantities by the many partic-
ipants in the commodity	 (wheat)	 markets.	 Improved	 (LANDSAT)
information then is introduced into the commodity market,
leading -- if relevant -- to new flows and different prices.
The changes in flows and prices owing to improved information
are then used as the basis for measuring benefits to society,
e.g.,	 the United States and individual sectors,
	 e.g.,	 farmers,
inventory holders and consumers.
Our practical aim is to structure an analysis of
benefits from improved crop information 	 (wheat)	 in such a
way as to satisfy our goals without introducing order of
magnitude errors.
	 With this as our principal operating thesis,
we have adopted the following conventions and operational
constraints.
First,	 an empirically detailed benefits analysis is
made only for wheat. 	 Substitution effects for other crops are
r
included in the analysis however.
F Second,	 benefits are estimated	 for	 the United States
and for the aggregated rest of the world.
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Third, benefits are separately assessed for con-
sumers and producers in the United States.
Fourth, the "futures" market is treated as a world
market.
Fifth, wheat is treated as a homogeneous commodity.
Sixth, ERS information will be made publicly
available in the same final form as current commodity informa-
tion through the same distribution network.
Seventh, benefits to regions and economic groups
are based on rational, i.e., profit-oriented, economic behavior.
At the heart of this study there are several major
methodological issues. They are:
• Identifying the costs or losses owing to in-
accurate information to consumers, producers,
inventory holders and societies.
• Identifying the benefits for different groups
and regions.
• Measuring the effect of improved information on
prices.
• Empirically estimating the market impulse response
coefficients in the U. S. and other markets for
wheat (i.e., quantifying the relevant elasticities).
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1.6	 organization of the Study
The organization and flow of the study are shown in
Figure 1.7. The study is divided into three parts; in each of
the three parts separate analytic efforts were carried out.
First, current wheat crop statistics and likely improvements
are analyzed; secondly, the effect of this improved information
on world wheat markets is studied; thirdly, benefits from changed
prices, quantities and trade flows are assessed.
There are four chapters and a set appendices in the
main report. Chapter 1 presents a slightly more technical ver-
sion of the Overview volume.
In Chapter 2 the technical and statistical character-
istics of current wheat crop estimates -- for major world regions
-- are set forth, as well as the potential improvements -- as-
sumed for this study -- of an Earth Resources Survey system of
the LANDSAT type. The assumptions used for these potential im-
provements are based on the technical goals expressed in current
research and development efforts -- foremost, the Large Area
Crop Inventory Experiment of NASA -- as well as an intelligent
interpretation of results of LANDSAT investigations to date.
From these foundations, a structural model of the
world markets for wheat is presented in Chapter 3. The world
markets for wheat are described and structured with careful
review of the parameters and factors central to the benefits
assessment. First, the economic characteristics of the var-
ious economic regions, the principal factors influencing
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trade and the analytical and empirical heritage of our modeling
effort are described. Then the relationships describing the
actions of the consumers, producers, inventory holders, specu-
lators and hedgers in wheat world trade are set forth. Finally,
the linkages between the various components of the full model
and skeletal framework of its numerical solution are presented.
The empirical quantification of the world markets
for wheat and the results of the benefit measures are presented
in Chapter 4. First, the estimated relationships and the esti-
mation strategy are described, and then the empirical results
are given. The benefit estimation model and the results are
then reported. Included here are estimated total benefits to
the United States along with their distribution patterns between
consumers and producers. Benefits to the rest of the world also
are presented.
In a separate appendix the foundations of crop in-
formation are described. It is supplementary to information
contained in the main report.
1.7	 Results of the Benefit Study
1.7.1	 The Long-term Benefits
A national, United States decision on the merits of
r	a worldwide LANDSAT system providing improved wheat crop measure-
ments has to be based on the long-term, lasting benefits to the
United States from such an investment.
The assumed performance of a worldwide LANDSAT sys-
tem in this study is ;:o provide 90 percent wheat crop estimates,
1-29
0
0i
0
1-30
i
with 90 percent confidence, from the time when the crop is
mature until harvest is complete in each of the eleven wheat
regions. No information improvement was assumed for China.
These "percentages" translate roughly into a 1.9 percent stan-
dard error in the December United States wheat crop estimate
and 5.0 percent for the rest of the world. While this perfor-
mance may seem very modest, in fact such a worldwide capability
is a significant improvement upon what is known today on wheat
crops. Using these performance standards as inputs to the AGR-
ECON II wheat commodity model, indeed significant impacts from
such information have been measured.
The principal long-term effects of such information
are first, a reduction in the fluctuation of wheat prices; i.e.,
i
increased price stability and second, a lowering of the aver-
age wheat price by about six to seven percent.
These price effects result in -- and in turn explain
-- the following other economic effects: United States wheat
consumption will increase by about 14 million bushels a year,
United States wheat exports will significantly increase by about
361 million bushels a year; United States consumers will spend
about $250 million a year less on the wheat consumed (directly
or on wheat products) and United States suppliers of wheat
(farmers, inventory holders, distributors, exporters) will save
about $280 million a year net in production costs. However,
after allowing for the slight drop in the average wheat price
level they will experience an average net loss of $113 million.
1
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The total export revenue to the United States will increase
-' by a net of $334 million a year -- where the gains from the
increased export volume of 361 million bushels are offset, 	 in
-- part, by a $293 million loss on United States wheat exports
$ from the new,	 lower average wheat price.
These joint effects of improved information on the
United States wheat economy are shown in Figure 1.8. 	 United
# States demand for wheat, prices of wheat in world markets be-
fore and after improved LANDSAT information, the cost of wheat
produced -- including risk and uncertainty -- and United States
S wheat exports to the rest of the world are shown in simplified
form.	 All these variables change simultaneously and by signi-
ficant amounts.	 The long-term benefits to United States society
are listed in Table 1.2.
It goes without saying that each of these benefit
estimates has some uncertainty attached to it, and the gains
in each particular year -- and for each region -- can be much
larger or smaller, depending on that year's: events 	 (weather,
economic conditions,	 trade policies,	 among others).	 For ex-
ample, the computer analyses done by ECON to date show the total
United States gains ranged from a low of $42 million to a high
of $331 million.	 The estimated benefits for the United States
and the rest of the world are the expected long-term gains.
1.7.2	 Short-term Effects and Benefits
The introduction of improved wheat crop information
leads to important short-term effects immediately after the
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Table 1.2	 Long -term Annual Benefits from LANDSA`P
Wheat Crop Information
Benefit, in Millions of
1975 Dollars
United States
Consumers Gains $287
Net Supply Losses -113
Total U.S. Benefits $174 million
Net Gain in U.S. Wheat
Export Revenues $334 million
I
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initial worldwide operations capability of a LANDSAT system.
Some of these effects are one-time and unique. Futures prices
will be affected first with spot prices following a few months
behind. Both futures and spot prices level off after the initial
twelve months of introducing, region-by-region, improved wheat
crop estimates. From then on, wheat prices show less volatility,
at a lower average price level, leading to the long-term bene-
fits listed in Section 1.7.1.
1.7.3	 A Reconstruction of 1972: The Year of The
Russian Wheat Deal
}
#
	
	 The AGR-ECON II wheat commodity model was used to
reconstruct the likely price changes -- month-by-month -- for
1972, in one without a LANDSAT system (baseline series) and then
#	 with a LANDSAT system. The results of the price changes between
the two series are shown in Figure 1.9: while the historical
prices began to move only after most of the wheat export con-
tracts were signed between the respective parties in July and
August of 1972, improved public information would have led to
substantially earlier price rises, beginning in May of that
#	 year and persisting through July 1972. While the Soviet Union
would have benefited from earlier, more accurate wheat crop in-
formation, so would the United States and all other participants
#	 in world commodity markets -- without unfair gains or losses,
real or perceived, by the countries involved. Among other things,
with the earlier movement of wheat prices in commodity markets,
#	 the Soviet Union would have contracted for fewer wheat imports,
leading to lower world wheat prices in the last part of 1972.
#
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Consumers in the United States and other world regions would
have been affected less.
Would the Soviet Union have gained from improved,
earlier information in 1972? Most certainly yes, since the
gains to the Soviet Union in the production and distribution of
its domestic crop (more than twice that of the United States)
would have outweighed by far the loss on the import deals which
the Soviet Union would have had to transact at higher wheat
prices. The benefits to the United States from such objective,
early and improved information would have been substantial in
1972.
In summary, improved public information on worldwide
wheat crops will substantially benefit the United States and
the rest of world. It is important to note that the informa-
tion improvements due to the LANDSAT-MSS assumed in this
study occur mostly outside the United States, in the rest of
world. The information derived from LANDSAT is assumed to be
made available to all countries at the same time, on a non-
discriminatory basis, similar to present practices of the
Statistical Reporting Service of USDA.
The quoted annual United States benefits of $174 million
are expected long-term benefits from wheat crop information.
These have to be compared to the "annualized" cost of a three-
satellite LANDSAT system of about $62 million.* The benefit
*The Economic Value of Remote Sensing of Earth Resources from
Space: An ERTS Overview and the Value of Continuity of Service,
Summary, ECON, Inc., December 1974.
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numbers are subject to further verification.
	 The benefits
1 listed are more sensitive to changes in economic and technical
variables than are the relatively certain costs.
	 The long-term
annual benefits listed herein might well be realized by 1985
if the United States were to decide in the near future on the
deployment of such a system.
In conclusion,	 accurate, worldwide wheat crop informa-
tion using space systems	 is likely to have a stabilizing in-
fluence on world commodity markets,
	 in part making possible the
est?'^lishment of	 long-term stable trade relationships.	 while
some may fear such public knowledge -- this might be the very
basis of making expanded agricultural trade possible. 	 In
this regard,	 the effect of	 improved objective information on
agriculture markets is potentially similar to the stabilizing
effect that information gathered from space has in strategic
areas.
1
1
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